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Early campaign economic perceptions can help to predict the
national verdict on Election Day
It is well known that elections are determined by certain fundamental variables: internal factors
that reflect voters’ long-term political predispositions and external factors that are unique to each
campaign. Robert S. Erikson and Christopher Wlezien examine how one external factor, the
state of the economy, compares to how voters’ internal factors evolve over the final 200 days of
presidential campaigns. They find that while noneconomic factors dominate at the outset of the
campaign, the economic component increases in salience as Election Day draws nearer and
offers greater electoral predictability overall.
This article is part of a collaboration with the PS: Political Science and Politics symposium on US
Presidential Election Forecasting.  Click here to read other posts in this series.
It commonly is said that elections are determined less by the quality of electoral campaigns than
by fundamental forces that astute observers can see coming in advance. We offer a system in
which electoral fundamentals come in two varieties: internal and external. Internal fundamentals
are part of the voter’s long-term political predispositions: party identification, ideological
proclivities, and demographically-based partisan orientations. External fundamentals are short-term forces unique
to the campaign, such as, but not limited to, the state of the economy. Both types impact the evolution of electoral
preferences in different ways. The internal ones operate as centripetal forces pushing the electorate toward 50-50
(a party line vote) and the external ones work as centrifugal forces pushing voters outward toward some unique
outcome specific to the issues of the day.
From available poll data, we estimate the presidential preferences of the electorate on a daily basis over the final
200 days of each of the 15 elections from 1956 to 2012. We also do the same for economic perceptions,
specifically, about current economic growth, as measured by the Survey of Consumers at the University of
Michigan. Using these two resources, we divide daily presidential preferences in different election years into two
components—the share that is predictable from economic perceptions on that date and the residual portion that is
unrelated to those perceptions.As a rough approximation, the section of the “vote” predictable from economic
perceptions serves as a proxy for the external fundamentals. The remaining residual portion proxies the internal
fundamentals. We ask: how do the two sources of voter preference (predictable versus not predictable from
economic perceptions) evolve over the final 200 days of presidential campaigns?
The Growing Effect of the Economy over the Campaign
We start with the early stages of the campaign, 200 days before the election (April of election year). At that time,
economic perceptions barely register as a predictor of the trial-heat polls (which pit possible presidential
contenders against each other in hypothetical general election matchups). See the left panel of Figure 1, which
plots the incumbent party candidate’s poll share and economic perceptions in April of the election year. The
correlation between economic perceptions and the polls at that time is negligible. By Election Day, however, voter
preferences are clearly responsive to perceptions of economic progress. This trend can be seen in the right panel
of Figure 1, which displays the incumbent party candidate’s vote share and economic perceptions at the end of
the cycle.
Figure 1: Predicting the Polls in April and the Vote in November from Economic
Perceptions at Each Point in Time
Next, we divide the daily trial-heat polls into the portion predicted from current economic perceptions and the
portion that is not. We want to observe how the spread of the daily predictions changes over the timeline, which
tells us how economic forces and other issues come to matter to voters. For this exercise, Figure 2 illustrates the
variance of the daily readings of the predicted values (economy) and the residuals (other factors) by day, for the
final 200 days of the election cycle—the point at which we have polls including the two final candidates in the 15
election years.
Figure 2:  Variances of from the Two Components of Daily Polls: The Parts Predicted by Economic
Perceptions and Other Sources.
In Figure 2 noneconomic factors dominate at the outset of the campaign, but then decline over time. Meanwhile,
the economic variance—the portion of trial-heat polls explained by economic perceptions—is small at the
beginning of the campaign but grows over time. It almost catches up with the noneconomic variance by the end of
the timeline.
How do we interpret this pattern?  Early in the election year, survey respondents are not paying much attention to
the economy when they answer pollsters’ questions about how they will vote. But they take into account other
things, such as their views of the current administration and early perceptions of the eventual presidential
candidates. As the campaign proceeds, noneconomic considerations become less important in voters’ minds,
especially partisanship. Meanwhile, the economic cue increases in salience and matters more in the aggregate.
Predicting the Vote from the Economy over the Campaign Timeline
So far, we have daily poll readings and we can account for the portion determined due by economic perceptions
and the remainder due to other factors, but which is more important in terms of predicting the Election Day vote?
To see, we analyze the actual presidential party vote on the daily economy-based poll prediction and the residual
portion of the polls. Figure 3 traces the portion of the Election Day variance in the vote that can be explained by
each component over the campaign timeline.
Figure 3: Proportion of the Variance in the Election Day Vote Explained by Daily
 Readings of the Economic and Noneconomic Components of Trial-Heat Polls
Figure 3 shows that both components of the trial-heat polls explain an increasing portion of the variance in the
vote. The later in the campaign, the more you can predict from current preferences. Note that the portion of the
polls that reflects the economy is the better predictor of the Election Day vote. This is true from the beginning of
the campaign until the end. In other words, if one could determine how much the trial-heat polls were influenced
by economic perceptions, that portion would be far more helpful for an Election Day prediction than the portion
predicted by other factors.
Let us summarize. Early in presidential campaigns, voters are not incorporating economic evaluations into their
electoral preferences; the economy has little impact on presidential polls of the moment. But early-campaign
economic perceptions are predictive of the national verdict on Election Day. At the same time, we see that the
portion of voter preferences that is not due to the economy has its impact, too.
Suppose you want to predict a US presidential election at various points along the campaign timeline. Over time,
trial-heat polls offer increasing forecasting power, as they increasingly reflect both the economic and
noneconomic fundamentals. But for forecasting purposes, it is helpful to consider the trial-heat polls as well as
what people are thinking at that moment about the national economy. This is especially true well before Election
Day. It also is true on Election Eve, as final pre-election polls do not fully reflect the state of the economy (or other,
noneconomic fundamentals).
This article is based on the paper “Forecasting US Presidential Elections Using Economic and Noneconomic
Fundamentals”  appearing in the PS: Political Science and Politics symposium on US Presidential Election
Forecasting. Click here to read the other posts in this series.
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